

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1366648-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 67

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1213375-0

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Sub division are:-

was earmarked for Mexico: he may already be there.

2. Until October/November 1959, the head of Dept. V. in the USA was Nikolay Alekseyevich KUZNETSOV who was in the U.N. in New York. This was his second posting in the U.S. On the first, he recruited a technician connected with electronics and computers for which he received a very high decoration. He was not liked in headquarters because he was always emphasizing his superior position and the fact that he had been decorated. During his second posting in the U.S., he produced no practical results and after encountering some "difficulties" was obliged to return unexpectedly to Russia in October or November 1959 leaving all his possessions behind. LYALIN believes that he is now teaching. The present head of Dept V. in the U.S. is believed by LYALIN to be [redacted] under U.N. cover in New York.

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3. There are currently two young Dept. V. officers in Washington: they had previously been subordinate to KUZNETSOV. [REDACTED] prior to going to the U.S. later this year: he will serve under U.S. cover in New York.

4. There is a Dept. V. officer in Colombia: he went there in late 1969/early 1970. LIALIN does not know if there is a Dept. V. representative in Canada. In November 1968 there was someone training to be a member of the Consular staff for Canada. This man might therefore be in Canada.

8th September, 1971.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per_
Date

~~ADG-1 J43 J41 J42~~
~~4-22-2015~~

Three 13th Dept. (now known as Dept. V) agents in the U.S. about whom LYALIN learnt from [redacted]

[redacted] U.K. who was to 1969/1970 was in the North and South American subdivision of Dept. V Headquarters:-

- b) An Armenian, now an American citizen living in the U.S. He left Armenia many years ago but still has relatives in Russia. He writes to his relatives not to officials and he uses an ancient Armenian language which is difficult to translate as it is not spoken today.

Note:- All three agents mentioned above are American citizens with American passports; they used their own identities. All three were current cases in 1969/70. [redacted] was not directly involved in them but heard about them as a result of sharing a room.

2. [redacted] has a contact in London who has Communist sympathies. The contact shares a flat with a young American [redacted]

[redacted] they advised him to travel to Europe to avoid the draft. Recently [redacted] has been holidaying in Morocco. In the U.K. he does occasional jobs to make a living. In places where he works, he tries to cause trouble, inciting strikes etc. Initially [redacted] was cultivating his contact with a view to finding out as much as possible about [redacted] and he met [redacted] twice. The Resident was sceptical about [redacted]

[redacted] interest in [redacted] lapsed but he continues to pay attention to the [redacted] was unable to say if there is a homosexual aspect to this case.

3.

When [redacted] was in Norway two years ago (sic) he recruited a major in the U.S. Army. The major was connected with building and construction techniques. He was subsequently posted to West Germany where he continued to be met by someone else. It appears that [redacted] was on friendly terms with a bookshop owner and he found the American's name on a mailing list for books. He asked the bookshop owner about the major, contrived a meeting in the shop and subsequently recruited him. LYALIN was unable to supply any further information about this major or the circumstances of his recruitment.

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4.

In 1964, the First Chief Directorate KGB received a document issued by the "American Security Service" for its officers on "What kind of behaviour must be shown towards Russian refugees and refugees from Slavonic countries". LYALIN does not know if this document originated from the U.S. or from the U.S. zone of Germany. It was distributed to all places where there were Russians who travelled abroad e.g. seaports. LYALIN saw a partial translation of it when it reached KLAYPEDA in 1965. The main points that he recalled were:-

- a) how to criticize the Russian way of life;
- b) what you may tell a Russian;
- c) how to treat a Russian refugee or escapee.

5.

[redacted] BREMEN, BREMENHAFEN, RIGA, VENTSPILS and KLAYPEDA, has been a KGB agent since 1963 working to one of LYALIN's former colleagues in KLAYPEDA. [redacted] has a relative, probably a cousin, whose husband is in the U.S. Navy working on military transports between HANGENHAFEN (sic) and Vietnam. [redacted] met this American in Germany and obtained from him information about security measures on board ship, cargoes, loading techniques and timetables of his transport which his controller considered very useful. LYALIN could not recall from which port the transport sailed but he thought that it could have been a small place in North Germany.

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6.

When [redacted] Counterintelligence Section in the KGB Residency in London, was in the U.S.A. (1963-1969) he had an agent offering him information about special classified cars.

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7.

In July 1971, an urgent report was received by the KGB Residency in London instructing all Political Section officers to concentrate on obtaining information on Sino-American relations. [redacted] informed LYALIN that [redacted] London, [redacted] from whom he intended to seek information. This American official had apparently been offered the post of "second man" in Singapore but he refused. He told [redacted] that he was either going to be an Ambassador in a very big

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~~TOP SECRET~~

country or somewhere else but that he was not going to be a Secretary somewhere especially in a place like Singapore.

8.

[redacted] has a non Soviet contact, possibly an American, who returned to London from Geneva on 22nd July 1971. [redacted] is particularly interested in this person because [redacted] works in the U.S. Embassy London. [redacted] has not yet met the girl in the U.S. Embassy.

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9.

[redacted] was until Nov/Dec 1970 Shell in London. He was in touch with [redacted] who was in London from 1965 to 1969. They met originally by chance in a cafe. [redacted] and he passed him technical reports "to help him". Before [redacted] was handed over to LYALIN with instructions to complete his recruitment and bring him under proper control. LYALIN accomplished this in the first two months. [redacted] provided a large volume of confidential reports from SHALL about the oil industry, e.g. research, developments, production, profits, plans, quarterly progress reports on the Stanley Research Centre etc. The material was normally collected from him on Friday and returned to him on Saturday so that he could replace it on Monday. [redacted] motive was mercenary and LYALIN paid him £40 for one year. He signed receipts in the name of [redacted] information which from an industrial point of view was considered very good was primarily of interest to the Scientific and Technical Section who were prepared to pay £200 for a complete set of Stanley Research Centre reports. In the second half of 1970, [redacted] was introduced to [redacted] of the Scientific and Technical Section but he did not care for [redacted] and he left for the U.S. at the end of 1970, without telling [redacted] LYALIN does not know of any attempts to re-establish contact with [redacted] in the U.S. In LYALIN's view it would probably be necessary to see from [redacted] employment whether there would be any advantage in recontacting him and if so who, e.g. [redacted] LYALIN himself would be available to make the contact. LYALIN had received a request from Moscow for [redacted] current address. He had intended to establish the address from another of his agents who is in touch with [redacted]

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10.

[redacted] Whilst in the U.K. she appears to have been [redacted] Jesuit Missions at 14 Park Street, Near Park Lane, W.1. (Tel No. 493-7811). [redacted] went to BOSTON to live with the wife's parents, but the last that LYALIN heard was that they were looking for a flat.

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8th September, 1971.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] HIS

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SUBORDINATE IN THE UK AND UP TO 1969/70 REPEAT 1969/70 WAS IN THE
AMERICAN EMBASSY IN [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS:-

(11) A GERMAN NATIONALISED AFRICAN, RECRUITED IN EAST GERMANY.
USED MONEY TO BUY A SMALL PLANE WHICH HE USES IN THE USA VISITS
WEST GERMANY AND THENCE TO EAST GERMANY TWICE A YEAR.

(119) AN ARMENIAN LIVING IN THE USA. HE LEFT ARMENIA MANY YEARS
AGO BUT STILL HAS RELATIVES IN RUSSIA, WITH WHOM HE CORRESPONDS.

(111) [REDACTED] USA. HE
SERVED IN VIETNAM [REDACTED]
ESTABLISHMENT IN WEST GERMANY. HE REGAINED CONTACT BY VISITING
THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN VIENNA.

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B) FOR A TIME [REDACTED] INTERESTED IN [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] LONDON. [REDACTED]

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INTEREST IN [REDACTED] APPEARS TO HAVE LAPSED BUT HE IS STILL
INTERESTED IN ONE OF [REDACTED] FLAT MATES.

C) A MAJOR IN THE AMERICAN ARMY RECRUITED IN NORWAY TWO YEARS AGO
[REDACTED] HE WAS LATER POSTED
TO WEST GERMANY WHERE HE IS STILL BEING MET. THE MAJOR WAS
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

D) IN 1964 THE FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE RECEIVED A DOCUMENT ISSUED
BY THE AMERICAN SECURITY SERVICE FOR ITS OFFICERS ON QUOTE WHAT KIND
OF BEHAVIOUR MUST BE SHOWN TOWARDS RUSSIAN REFUGEES AND REFUGEES
FROM SLAVONIC COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. NOT KNOWN WHETHER THE DOCUMENT
ORIGINATED IN THE U.S. OR WEST GERMANY.

E) A MEMBER OF THE U.S. NAVY [REDACTED]

VIETNAM IS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] KGB

AGENT SINCE 1964. [REDACTED] IN GERMANY AND HAS
OBTAINED INFORMATION FOR [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON FROM WHOM HE INTENDED TO SEEK INFORMATION ABOUT SINO AMERICAN RELATIONS, A KGB PRIORITY SINCE JULY 1971.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON. THE CONTACT ARRIVED IN LONDON [REDACTED] GENEVA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

17. LYALIN HAS IDENTIFIED NIKOLAY ALEKSEYEVICH KUZNETSOV, REPEAT KUZNETSOV AS FORMER HEAD OF THE 13TH DEPARTMENT IN THE U.S. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN THE U.S. NEW YORK.

THE LATTER MET THE [REDACTED] IN VIENNA (PARA. AC111).

ABOVE)

[REDACTED]

4. LYALIN'S DESIRE IS TO REMAIN AND SETTLE IN THE UK ALONG WITH

[REDACTED] AT PRESENT HE DOES NOT WANT TO SEE REPRESENTATIVES OF ANY OTHER SERVICE, BUT I SHALL LET YOU KNOW WHEN IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR YOUR OFFICERS TO HAVE ACCESS TO HIM IF YOU SO DESIRE.

5. MEANTHILE WE SHALL BE READY TO PUT ANY QUESTIONS TO HIM ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE.

6. THERE IS NO RESTRICTION ON INVESTIGATION BEING STARTED ON THE CASES UNQUOTE.

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED TO THE U.S.
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-133949
NYFILE: 105-65761
WFOFILE:

SEP 28 1971

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~ (U)
GROUP 1

The Bureau advised on 9/10/71. of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

① - 105-LYALIN

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-LYALIN

2 - 105-134282

2 - 105-133949

b7D

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

For ADG / J43 J44 T42
Date 4-22-2015

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per ADG
Date 4-22-2015

~~J43541742~~
~~4-22-2015~~

New York, New York

~~SECRET~~ (U)
OCT 9 SEP 6 1971

Nikolai Alekseevich Kuznetsov

The subject was born on October 15, 1921, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). He first arrived in the United States on February 17, 1953, as an employee of the United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC) in the Russian Translation Unit. He departed the United States on May 13, 1954, and returned on December 3, 1954, with his wife, Stepanida Kuznetzova. He remained in the United States until July 11, 1957, when he returned to the Soviet Union.

The subject returned to the United States on December 23, 1966, as First Secretary of the Soviet Mission to the UN. He departed the United States for Montreal, Canada, and purportedly the Soviet Union on November 15, 1967, and returned to the United States on December 25, 1967. He last departed the United States on September 17, 1968.


The subject was involved in an automobile accident on September 11, 1968, and it is not known whether or not this was the reason for his departure on September 17, 1968.

The subject maintained his apartment in New York upon his departure on September 17, 1968, and it was subsequently occupied by another Soviet national.

Based upon available information and/or investigation the data furnished by Oleg Lyalin concerning subject's Soviet intelligence affiliation appears to be accurate.

- 1* -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-01 BY 60322
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE, THIS DOCUMENT
IS NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED
OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.



115626-23

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

October 7, 1971

[REDACTED]

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The source advised that the [REDACTED]
Department V in the United States is believed to be a
[REDACTED] under United
Nations cover in New York.

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It is suggested that source be shown the attached
photograph of [REDACTED] in an attempt to make a
positive identification of this individual [REDACTED]
Department V in the United States.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

[REDACTED]

105-115020-4

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per ADG/J43 J41 T42
Date 9-22-2015

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

OCT 1 5 1971

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET(U)"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

Bureau

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
(1) - New York 65-388

2 - 105-37364
2 - 105-
2 - 105-216642

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[REDACTED]

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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per ADG/J43J41742
Date 4-22-2015

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NY 105-115626

Recently, in conversation [redacted]
[redacted] indicated that he
had been expecting the new Chief [redacted]
[redacted] to arrive in the US but, to date, no
information has been received from Moscow relative to this
arrival. [redacted] stated that he does not know whether
LYALIN's defection has had any effect in this matter.

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

OCT 15 1971

SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
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WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
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b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
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b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
GROUP 1 ~~(U)~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]

1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 65-68220
2 - 65-67654
2 - 105-173367
2 - 105-115626

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Per
Date

~~SECRET~~ (U)
ADG/34354142
4-22-2015

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NY 105-115626

The following information was developed in an effort to explore the effects of any action directed against some of the long-time KGB American agents handled by the NY Residency. Of particular concern in this regard would be the personal security of the reporting source. It was mentioned to the source that some conjecture had been given to the possibility of "exposing" the identities of some of the American agents by means of newspaper publicity. Examples cited centered on [redacted]

[redacted] Line X.

The source advised that any action directed against [redacted] could not possibly effect his personal security but that any action against [redacted]

[redacted] The source explained [redacted]

[redacted] "Line X" [redacted]

[redacted] The source

concluded that, [redacted]

to the Soviet Union [redacted]

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OCT 19 1971

[Redacted]

WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [Redacted],
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [Redacted] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
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SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET(U)"~~
~~GROUP I~~

The Bureau advised on 10/1/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [Redacted]

- | <u>New York</u> | <u>Bureau</u> |
|---|----------------|
| 1 - 105-65761 (SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED US) | 2 - 105-133949 |
| ① - 105-115626 (LYALIN) | 2 - 105-216642 |
| 1 - [Redacted] | 2 - 105-134282 |
| | 2 - [Redacted] |
| | 2 - [Redacted] |
| 1 - New York | 2 - 105-109535 |

DOWNGRADED TO
~~SECRET~~
Per ADG/343341742
Date 4-22-205

~~SECRET~~

SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....
FILED.....
9 1971
YORK
[Signature]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

[redacted]

Source has learned from [redacted]
"Line KR" NY Residency, [redacted]
[redacted] Residency in London, [redacted] KGB

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OLEG LYALIN in London. [redacted]

[redacted] KGB Headquarters [redacted]

According to [redacted]
LYALIN had been drinking and Moscow had summoned LYALIN to
the USSR because of his drinking activities. Reportedly,
[redacted] LYALIN's behalf and indicated to
Headquarters that LYALIN was a good worker and his (LYALIN's)
drinking problem could be controlled by the Residency.

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Source also learned from [redacted] that the woman who
defected with LYALIN is the daughter of a General attached
[redacted] Source was unable [redacted]

b6
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b7D

Source indicated that [redacted]
the KGB Residency in London [redacted]
[redacted] It is source's opinion that the people
reportedly expelled from Headquarters were employees within
different Lines of KGB organization and were not all members
of Department "S" or "V".

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b7C
b7D

It should be noted that [redacted] available
at the NYO. indicates that [redacted]

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OCT 19 1971



WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 10/1/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

Bureau

1 - 105-115626 (LYALTN)	2 - 105-216642
1 - [REDACTED]	
1 - New York	2 - 105-131411

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per: PDG/J43J4LTU2
Date: 4-22-2015

SEARCHED	INDEXED
71	
K	



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(U)

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Source learned that no additional security changes have been initiated in the NY KGB Residency as a result of the defection of OLEG LYALIN. However, source learned that



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[REDACTED]

OCT 19 1971

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IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
GROUP I

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

NEW YORK

WASHINGTON FIELD

BUREAU

[REDACTED]
1-105-115626 (LYALIN)
1-NEW YORK

1-105-LYALIN
1- [REDACTED]

2-105-86457
2-105-104335
2-105-216642
2- [REDACTED]

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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per AOG-1343 J41742
Date 8-22-2015

SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....FILED.....

9 1971
YORK

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

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[redacted]

Source feels that [redacted]
the Washington, D.C. KGB Residency, [redacted]
to the Soviet Defector OLEG LYALIN.

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In that regard, source recalls that in
approximately [redacted]
the USSR [redacted] Washington [redacted]
[redacted] OLEG KALUGIN, Former
Chief of "Line PR", Washington, D.C. Residency, [redacted]
FBI [redacted] KGB and his
Washington [redacted]

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In that regard, [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] Washington, D.C.,
KGB Residency as a "Line PR" [redacted]
[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

[REDACTED]

OCT 19 1971

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WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
GROUP I (U)

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

NEW YORK

BUREAU

- 1- [REDACTED]
- 1- 105-115626 (LYALIN)
- 1- [REDACTED]
- 1- 65-23722 (KGB-SECURITY)
- 1- [REDACTED]
- 1- NEW YORK

- 2-105-199150
- 2-105-216642
- 2-105-186630
- 2-65-69724
- 2- [REDACTED]

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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per ADG J43 J41 742
Date 4-22-2015

~~SECRET~~ (U)

31 52 57

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
OCT 19 1971	
FBI - NEW YORK	

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

Source stated that he has not had any opportunity for conversations concerning intelligence matters with either

[redacted] "Line KR", [redacted]

[redacted] Source noted that in view of the atmosphere created by the OLEG LYALIN defection, he (source) does not anticipate seeking out either of these individuals for any discussion, unless dictated by his (source's) assignments.

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In that regard, source made the observation that since [redacted] is scheduled to return to the USSR permanently before the end of 1971, [redacted] LYALIN, it would be to the FBI's best interests to pay specific attention to [redacted] activities during the next few months. Source is remaining alert for any information concerning the activities of the "KR" Branch.

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In addition, source noted that during conversation with [redacted] "Line X" [redacted] indicated that "Line KR" was extremely interested in the US government agencies, including [redacted] "KR" Branch. In that regard they are interested in the US Government Building located at 90 Church Street, New York, New York.

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~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED TO US
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-133949
NYFILE: 105-65761
WFOFILE:

OCT 19 1971

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
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SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)
GROUP I

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

NEW YORK

1-105-115626 (LYALIN)

1-NEW YORK

BUREAU

2-105-216642

2-105-133949

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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per AOG/J43/11/12
Date 9-27-2011

~~SECRET~~

SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....FILED.....
71
RK

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~~SECRET~~

NY 105-65761

Source indicated that [redacted]
[redacted] "V" Department, KGB Head-
quarters, Moscow, [redacted] OLEG LYALIN, who
[redacted] Britain. Source noted that [redacted]
[redacted] KGB Residency, Helsinki, Finland.


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~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

It is requested that OLEG A. LYALIN be questioned concerning the following Soviet nationals [redacted] in the US. Certain identifying data has been included and may be used to assist LYALIN in his recollection of these individuals.

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DOWNGRADED TO

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Per ADG/J4384172
Date 4-22-2011

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

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NOV 4 1971

[REDACTED]

WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~ (U)
GROUP 1

The Bureau advised on 10/18/71, of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- ① - 105-115626 (LYALIN)
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - 100-92701 (UN PERSONNEL, USSR)
- 1 - 100-92701 (SOVIET LONG ISLAND ESTATE)
- 1 - New York

Bureau

- 2 - 105-131411
- 2 - 105-186630
- 2 - 105-216642
- 2 - 65-57773
- 2 - 62-77787-240
- 2 -

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per AOG/34824/T42
Date 4-22-2015

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

b7D

The source has previously advised that [REDACTED]

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The NY KGB Residency received a communication from KGB Headquarters, Moscow, signed by the Chief of the KGB, YURIY ANDROPOV. [REDACTED] This communication [REDACTED] NY KGB Residency.

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[REDACTED]

Continuing, the source advised [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The source said
that this communication [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The source believes [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] "Line X", NY
Residency, with reference to the above communication.

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[REDACTED]

Continuing, the source stated that the defections
of LYALIN [REDACTED]

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b7D

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SAN FRANCISCO SOVIET CONSUL
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-210032
NYFILE: 105-112777
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
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SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~ (U)
GROUP I

The Bureau advised on 10/22/71, of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

1 - 105-65671 (SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED US)
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - 105-113020 (LYALIN)
1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-133949
2 -
2 - 105-216642
2 - 105-210032

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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per ADG/TAG/JAH/TJZ
Date 4-22-2015

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~~SECRET~~

NY 105-112777

Information has previously been furnished to
the effect that [REDACTED]

as "Line X" [REDACTED]

With reference to the above the source advised
that he did not believe that the recent defection of
OLEG LYALIN could have altered these assignments. He
said this was merely his opinion [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

WFOFILE:

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IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
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b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

"~~TOP SECRET~~"
GROUP 1 (U)

The Bureau advised on 10/22/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

Bureau

1 - 105-115626 (LYALIN)

2 - 105-216642

1
1
1
1

1 - New York

2 -

2

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[REDACTED]

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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per ADG/J43 J41 T42
Date 4-22-2015

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

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b7D

As a result of the recent defection of OLEG LYALIN
in Great Britain. [REDACTED] NY
KGB Residency. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LYALIN's defection. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] British Prime Minister Sir EDWARD HEATH,
[REDACTED] Soviets from
[REDACTED] LYALIN defection. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Prime Minister. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] British business-
men [REDACTED] Soviet
Government [REDACTED] Prime Minister HEATH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

With reference to the above [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

The source stated that, to his knowledge, no
additional KGB officers have been recalled to the Soviet
Union as a result of the LYALIN defection. Nor is the
source [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

New York, New York
November 15, 1971

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

b7D

The source advised that an Armenian, now an American citizen, living in the United States (US) is an agent of the 13th Department. He left Armenia many years ago, but still has relatives in Russia. He writes to his relatives, not to officials, and he uses an ancient Armenian language which is difficult to translate as it is not spoken today.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

-1*-

Per ADG-1343 J41 J42
Date 4-22-2015

105-10000-77

Rev. 5-18-71)

FBI

Transmit in _____ Via Airtel
(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

Date 12/10/71

To: SACs, New York (105-115626) (Enclosures)
WFO (105-106153) (Enclosures)

From: Director, FBI (105-216642)

OLEG A. LYALIN
ESP - R

There are attached for each office one copy of a memorandum dated 12/7/71 received from [] and one copy of a list of Soviet officials in the U. S. as of 12/8/71. You will note that [] in its memorandum requests photographs or details of Soviet officials in the U. S. who might be known to Lyalin.

Each office should furnish the Bureau with a photograph of all Soviet officials currently in the U. S. serving in New York and Washington. These photographs will be furnished to [] for display to Lyalin along with the list of Soviet officials in the U. S. The Bureau feels that displaying all photographs of Soviet officials in the U. S. to Lyalin is the most secure way of determining the extent of his knowledge of Soviet intelligence officers without revealing to him the extent of our knowledge. Handle promptly in accordance with [] request.

(Do not type below this line.)

105-216642-91

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 10 1971	
FBI - NEW YORK	

[]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 2-12-71)

(Copies to Office checked)

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany
☐ Albuquerque
☐ Alexandria
☐ Anchorage
☐ Atlanta
☐ Baltimore
☐ Birmingham
☐ Boston
☐ Buffalo
☐ Butte
☐ Charlotte
☐ Chicago
☐ Cincinnati
☐ Cleveland
☐ Columbia
☐ Dallas
☐ Denver
☐ Detroit
☐ El Paso
☐ Honolulu

☐ Houston
☐ Indianapolis
☐ Jackson
☐ Jacksonville
☐ Kansas City
☐ Knoxville
☐ Las Vegas
☐ Little Rock
☐ Los Angeles
☐ Louisville
☐ Memphis
☐ Miami
☐ Milwaukee
☐ Minneapolis
☐ Mobile
☐ Newark
☐ New Haven
☐ New Orleans
☒ New York City
☐ Norfolk

☐ Oklahoma City
☐ Omaha
☐ Philadelphia
☐ Phoenix
☐ Pittsburgh
☐ Portland
☐ Richmond
☐ Sacramento
☐ St. Louis
☐ Salt Lake City
☐ San Antonio
☐ San Diego
☐ San Francisco
☐ San Juan
☐ Savannah
☐ Seattle
☐ Springfield
☐ Tampa
☐ Washington Field
☐ Quantico

TO LEGAT:

☐ Beirut
☐ Bern
☐ Bonn
☐ Buenos Aires
☐ Caracas
☐ Copenhagen
☐ Hong Kong
☐ La Paz
☐ London
☐ Madrid
☐ Managua
☐ Mexico City
☐ Ottawa
☐ Paris
☐ Rome
☐ Tel Aviv
☐ Tokyo

Date Feb 15, 1972


RE:

OLEG A. LYALIN
ESP-R

105-115626-21

☒ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by _____
☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.
☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____

Remarks: _____



Enc. 1
Bufile 105-216642
Urfile

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

DOWNGRADED TO


~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per ADG-1 J13 J41 T42
Date 4-22-2015

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~~TOP SECRET~~

b6
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There are also attached photographs of the above-mentioned individuals with identifying data on the reverse side. These may be shown to OLEG LYALIN.

-3-

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 2-12-71)

(Copies to Office checked)

TO: SAC:

<input type="checkbox"/> Albany	<input type="checkbox"/> Houston	<input type="checkbox"/> Oklahoma City	TO LEGAT:
<input type="checkbox"/> Albuquerque	<input type="checkbox"/> Indianapolis	<input type="checkbox"/> Omaha	<input type="checkbox"/> Beirut
<input type="checkbox"/> Alexandria	<input type="checkbox"/> Jackson	<input type="checkbox"/> Philadelphia	<input type="checkbox"/> Bern
<input type="checkbox"/> Anchorage	<input type="checkbox"/> Jacksonville	<input type="checkbox"/> Phoenix	<input type="checkbox"/> Bonn
<input type="checkbox"/> Atlanta	<input type="checkbox"/> Kansas City	<input type="checkbox"/> Pittsburgh	<input type="checkbox"/> Buenos Air
<input type="checkbox"/> Baltimore	<input type="checkbox"/> Knoxville	<input type="checkbox"/> Portland	<input type="checkbox"/> Caracas
<input type="checkbox"/> Birmingham	<input type="checkbox"/> Las Vegas	<input type="checkbox"/> Richmond	<input type="checkbox"/> Copenhagen
<input type="checkbox"/> Boston	<input type="checkbox"/> Little Rock	<input type="checkbox"/> Sacramento	<input type="checkbox"/> Hong Kong
<input type="checkbox"/> Buffalo	<input type="checkbox"/> Los Angeles	<input type="checkbox"/> St. Louis	<input type="checkbox"/> La Paz
<input type="checkbox"/> Butte	<input type="checkbox"/> Louisville	<input type="checkbox"/> Salt Lake City	<input type="checkbox"/> London
<input type="checkbox"/> Charlotte	<input type="checkbox"/> Memphis	<input type="checkbox"/> San Antonio	<input type="checkbox"/> Madrid
<input type="checkbox"/> Chicago	<input type="checkbox"/> Miami	<input type="checkbox"/> San Diego	<input type="checkbox"/> Managua
<input type="checkbox"/> Cincinnati	<input type="checkbox"/> Milwaukee	<input type="checkbox"/> San Francisco	<input type="checkbox"/> Mexico City
<input type="checkbox"/> Cleveland	<input type="checkbox"/> Minneapolis	<input type="checkbox"/> San Juan	<input type="checkbox"/> Ottawa
<input type="checkbox"/> Columbia	<input type="checkbox"/> Mobile	<input type="checkbox"/> Savannah	<input type="checkbox"/> Paris
<input type="checkbox"/> Dallas	<input type="checkbox"/> Newark	<input type="checkbox"/> Seattle	<input type="checkbox"/> Rome
<input type="checkbox"/> Denver	<input type="checkbox"/> New Haven	<input type="checkbox"/> Springfield	<input type="checkbox"/> Tel Aviv
<input type="checkbox"/> Detroit	<input type="checkbox"/> New Orleans	<input type="checkbox"/> Tampa	<input type="checkbox"/> Tokyo
<input type="checkbox"/> El Paso	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New York City	<input type="checkbox"/> Washington Field	
<input type="checkbox"/> Honolulu	<input type="checkbox"/> Norfolk	<input type="checkbox"/> Quantico	

Date Feb 16, 1972

RE:

OLEG A. LYALIN
ESP-R

☒ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by _____
☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conc sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.
☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____


Remarks:

Enclosure in re: let 14 Jan 1972
 Ref: sent to ur office
2/15/72

b7D

Enc. 1
Bufile
Urfile 105-216642

~~TOP SECRET~~



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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per PDG/J43/J41/T42
Date 4-22-2015

~~SECRET~~

JAN 11 1972

b6
b7C
b7D

WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
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b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
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b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP I~~ (U)

The Bureau advised on 12/17/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

CHIEF CLERK
POST

BUREAU

NEW YORK

2 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
2-SOVIETS
NEVER ASSIGNED
TO US
2 [REDACTED]
2-LYALIN

[REDACTED]
105-124571 1-105-67186
105-133949 1-105-65761
[REDACTED]
105-216642 1-105-115626


b6
b7C
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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per AUG 14 1974 J42
Date 4-22-2015

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
[redacted]
"T" Directorate in KGB Headquarters, Moscow. [redacted]
[redacted] sent
a communication to the New York Residency referring to
this case. [redacted]
[redacted] First Department of the
"T" Directorate.

b6
b7C
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With reference to the above, [redacted]
[redacted] a "Line X" [redacted] NY KGB Residency, who
[redacted]
[redacted]
because of OLEG LYALIN's defection in London, England.
[redacted]

b6
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b7D

In this regard it had previously been
reported that [redacted] "Line X"
in the KGB Residency, London. [redacted]
[redacted] First Department of
Directorate "T".

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted] First Department. [redacted]
[redacted] First Department of the "T" Directorate is
[redacted] "Line X" [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
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[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

requested [REDACTED] go, the British Government
England because of his
intelligence activities while assigned in London.

b6
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~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7D

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
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b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST". IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET
FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED
IN REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED
BY [REDACTED]

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~(U)

The Bureau advised on 4/5/73 of the then
recent receipt of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

Bureau

New York

105-186630
105-
105-155064

1 - 105-106218
① - 105-115626
1 - 105-98706

b6
b7C
b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by 243
Exempt from automatic downgrading 100-
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per A06154334142
Date 4-22-2015

b6
b7C

BÜ 105-155064

~~TOP SECRET~~

It is to be noted that sometime in the past, the Scientific and Technical (S & T) Branch ("Line X") at the New York (NY) KGB Residency had an interest in the following individual and maintained the following information concerning that individual.

[redacted]
S & T Branch, NY [redacted] United States
(US), [redacted]

b6
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b7D

[redacted] S & T [redacted]
[redacted] NY KGB Residency.

OLEG LYALIN was a former Soviet intelligence officer who defected in England.

At some time, exact date unknown, the NY Residency received information from Moscow which indicated that in 1960 [redacted] intelligence school with LYALIN. LYALIN had been in [redacted] Moscow headquarters requested that the NY Residency report [redacted] opinion concerning the extent to which he [redacted] was known by LYALIN [redacted] LYALIN.

b6
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b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R

AUG 27 1974

~~TOP SECRET~~

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST". IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET
FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED
IN REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED
BY [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~ (U)

The Bureau advised on 8/15/74 of the then
recent receipt of the following information from [REDACTED]

	<u>Bureau</u>
2 - [REDACTED]	61-3499
2 - [REDACTED]	65-75232
2 - [REDACTED]	65-74436
2 - LYALIN	105-216642

	<u>New York</u>
1 - [REDACTED]	
1 - [REDACTED]	
1 - [REDACTED]	65-25776
① - [REDACTED]	105-115626

Classified by ~~2355~~ ~~2643~~
Exempt from GDS, Category 1, 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

105-115626-406

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
AUG 27 1974	
FBI NEW YORK	

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per ~~ADG-1~~ 34334 742
Date ~~4-27-2015~~

Bu 105-216542

~~TOP SECRET~~

As indicated previously, Moscow Headquarters has devised a new technique for handling Scientific and Technical Directorate agents in the US.

No information is currently available as to whether this policy, now applicable to the US, would also be implemented in other western democracies such as England and France.

However, it has been learned that after the defection of OLEG LYALIN in Great Britain in 1971, [redacted]

[redacted] Scientific and Technical Directorate [redacted] Soviet principals in England, [redacted]

[redacted] Scientific and Technical Directorate operations in England.

According to [redacted] Scientific and Technical Directorate agents operating in England under the direction of the S & T Branch KGB personnel had not been compromised despite LYALIN's defection, since LYALIN had no real knowledge of S & T Branch activities. [redacted]

[redacted] Scientific and Technical Directorate, KGB Headquarters, Moscow. According to [redacted] the KGB [redacted]

[redacted] OLEG LYALIN [redacted] Therefore, according to [redacted] KGB [redacted] which LYALIN [redacted] British. [redacted]

KGB [redacted]

b6
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b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

John
How about the 304
U.S. case 1.
gone now? Are
any of these still
active?

OK
2. Soviet American
advised
JB

~~TOP SECRET~~

Bu 105-216642

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

[redacted]
[redacted] KGB [redacted]
[redacted] KGB.

b6
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[redacted] mentioned above, [redacted]
[redacted] S&T Directorate, Moscow, Headquarters.

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b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

DIRECTOR, FBI

9/24/74

SAC, NEW YORK

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

IS-R
[REDACTED] (S)

ReNY dissemination memo, dated 8/27/74, captioned
OLEG LYALIN.

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED] EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION
ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD
CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE
THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "A
SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST." IT
SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS RECENTLY
RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET FORTH
IN DISSEMINATION.

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN
REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY [REDACTED]

Information recently received from [REDACTED]
indicates that KGB headquarters, Moscow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OLEG LYALIN by the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

(1-New York (105-115626)(LYALIN)

NJH:amm
(6)

Classified by 2607
Exempt from GDS, Category 2-3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FBI - NEW YORK	

Per ADG/1043141 T42
Date 9-22-2011

~~SECRET~~

105-115626-402

[redacted] (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

b1
b3

b7D

[redacted]
It is to be recalled that at the time of the
defection of ODEG LYALIN, [redacted]

b1
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b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] (S)

If in fact this recent information from [redacted]

[redacted]
b6
b7C
b7D

Dissemination of this information is being held in
abeyance by the NYO. It is not known by this office what
has been previously given to US Army Intelligence [redacted]
[redacted] or if the Oklahoma office is knowledgeable
concerning matters [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

The Bureau is requested to advise the NYO if it
desires this office to prepare suitable dissemination on
captioned matter for interested agencies and field offices.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~(U)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
CHARACTER: [REDACTED]

OCT 10 1974

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET
FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED
IN REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED
BY [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION:

~~TOP SECRET~~(U)

The Bureau advised on 10/3/74, of the then
recent receipt of the following information from
[REDACTED]

2 - LYALIN
2 - [REDACTED]
2 - [REDACTED]


Bureau

105-

61-3499

New York

105-115626
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By 1235 HAND
Exempt from GDS Category 2&3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

UPGRADED TO (U)
SECRET

Per ADG-1343-741742
Date 4-22-2015

~~TOP SECRET~~

Bu 61-3499

Source has [redacted]

[redacted] Line KR
in NY, [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
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b7D

Source did not indicate whether it
might be conceivable for KGB Headquarters to

[redacted]
[redacted] Line V in NY. It was indicated however,
that subsequent to the defection of OLEG LYALIN
in Great Britain in 1971, the NY Residency [redacted]
[redacted] Line V agents [redacted] NY and

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] NY Residency branches. In
this manner Line X [redacted]

[redacted] Line V agents [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Line V agents.

It was indicated [redacted]

[redacted] KGB might, under certain specific
circumstances, such as the defection of LYALIN,

b6
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b7D

[redacted] LYALIN, while assigned to the KGB
Residency in Great Britain, [redacted]
[redacted] Line V in NY and therefore it

[redacted] KGB

[redacted] Line V
agents in NY, [redacted]
[redacted]

It is noted that [redacted]

Line V KGB [redacted]
[redacted] Line X by Line V.

b6
b7C
b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

JUL 21 1976

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
CHARACTER: [REDACTED]

b7D

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
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FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED
IN REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED
BY [REDACTED]

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~ (U)

The Bureau advised on 6/17/76 of the then
recent receipt of the following information from
[REDACTED]

b7D

Bureau

New York

2 - LYALIN
2 - [REDACTED]

105-216642
61-3499

① - 105-115626
1 - [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

"ROUTE IN ENVELOPE"

105-115626-412

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUL 23 1976	
FBI - NEW YORK	

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Exempt from GDS Category: 2&3
Date of Declassification: Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED
FDG/J43J41742
4-22-2015

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

Bu 61-3499

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Concerning the current status of [redacted]
within the KGB, [redacted]

[redacted] KGB [redacted]
of the defection in England of OLEG LYALIN, it was indicated
currently, [redacted]

[redacted] KGB, [redacted]
Central Committee of the Communist Party. It was indicated

[redacted]

[redacted] LYALIN's defection [redacted]

It is to be noted that according to available
information, it would appear that [redacted]

[redacted] Sweden. It was learned that

[redacted] KGB office [redacted]

[redacted] KGB, [redacted]

[redacted] KGB, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] KGB [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)